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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE
OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Sec. 7828-2(h)

(1986).

Memmott

(hereinafter "Memmott") appeals the

findings and judgment rendered by the Honorable Ray M. Harding,
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab County, to wit:
1.

Memmott entered into a written contract with EWP

pursuant to which EWP was to provide certain surveying and
related

services

and

Memmott

was

to

compensate

EWP

therefore;
2.

EWP substantially performed its services under said

contract;
3.

Memmott materially breached his contract with EWP

by failing and refusing to compensate EWP as agreed and must
pay damages of $6,000 plus interest, costs, and attorneys
fees;
4.

The other named defendants are not liable to EWP on

the subject debt.
Copies of the trial court's Memorandum Decision, Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment are attached
hereto as Appendices A through C, respectively.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Was Plaintiff's Exhibit

1, a copy

of the contract

between EWP and Memmott, properly admitted in to evidence.
2.

Has Memmott marshalled all of the evidence in support of

the trial court's findings of fact.
3.

Has Memmott considered the evidence which supports the

trial court's findings of fact in a light most favorable to those
findings.
4.

Has Memmott demonstrated that the trial court's findings

of fact are clearly erroneous.
5.

Is Memmott's appeal regarding the liability of his co-

defendants properly before this Court.
6.

Did Memmott have actual or apparent authority to enter

into a contract with EWP on behalf of all of the defendants.

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Annotated Sect 78-25-16 (1953):

Parole Evidence of Contents of Writings-When Admissible.

There

can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the
writing itself, except in the following cases:
(1)

When the original has been lost or destroyed, in which

case proof of the loss or destruction must first be made,
(2)

When the original is in the possession of the party

against whom the evidence is offered and he fails to produce it
after reasonable notice.
(3)

When the original is a record or other document in the

custody of a public officer.
(4)

When the original has been recorded, and the record or

a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this code or other
statute.
(5)

When the

original

consists

of numerous accounts or

other documents which cannot be examined in Court without great
loss of time, and

the evidence

sought from them

is only the

general result of the whole.
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a
profession or calling, or any department or agency of government,
in

the

regular

course

of

business

or

activity

has

kept

or

recorded any memorandum, writing> entry, print, representation or
combination

thereof,

of

any

act,

transaction,

occurrence

or

event, and in the regular course of business is caused any or all
of

the

same

to

be

recorded,

copied
3

or

reproduced

by

any

photographic,

photostatic,

microfilm,

micro-card,

miniature

photographic, or other process which accurately reproduces or
forms a durable medium

for so reproducing the original, the

original may be destroyed
unless

its

preservation

in the regular course of business
is

required

by

law;

and

such

reproduction, was satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in
evidence

as

the

original

itself

and

any

judicial

or

administrative proceeding whether the original is in existence or
not, and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is
likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is
in existence and available for inspection under direction of
Court.

The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or

facsimile, does not preclude admission of the original.
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3) and (4) , a copy
of the original, or of the record, must be produced; and those
mentioned in subdivisions

(1) and

(2) , either a copy of oral

evidence of the contents.

2.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1002:
Requirement of Original.

writing,
recording,

recording,
or

or

photograph

To prove the content of a

photograph,
is

the

required,

original

except

as

writing,
otherwise

provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of this state or by statute.
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3.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1003:
Admissibility of Duplicates.

A duplicate is admissible to

the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is
raised

as to the authenticity

of the original or

(2) in the

circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu
of the original.

4.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1004:
Admissibility of Other Evidence and Contents.

The original

is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing,
recording, or photograph is admissible if:
(1)

Original is lost or destroyed.

All originals are lost

or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed
them in bad faith; or
(2)

Original not obtainable.

No original can be obtained

by any available judicial process or procedure; or
(3)

Original in possession of opponent.

At a time when an

original was under the control of the party against whom offered,
he was put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the
content would be a subject of proof at the hearing and he does
not produce the original at the hearing; or
(4)

Collateral

matters.

The

writing,

recording,

photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue.

5

or

5.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) (1987):
Findings by the Court, (a) Effect.

In all actions tried

upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall

find

conclusions

the
of

facts
law

specially

thereon,

and

pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting

and

state

judgment

separately

shall

or refusing

be

its

entered

interlocutory

injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of
fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its
action.

Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of

review.

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary

evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

The findings of a

master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court.

It will be sufficient

if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or
appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the
court.

The trial court need not enter findings of fact and

conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in
Rule 41(b).

The court shall, however, issue a brief written

statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56 and 59 when the motion is
based on more than one ground.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EWP initiated litigation against Memmott, et al. for, inter
alia, breach of written contract arising out of the defendants7
failure to compensate EWP for surveying and related services
provided under said contract.

EWP's services were provided to

assist Memmott, et al. in severance proceedings involving U.S.
Interstate
defendants.

15 and mining claims jointly owned by the named
Memmott, et al. defended on the basis that EWP had

charged more than agreed for its services, that they had not
signed the contract, and/or that the services provided by EWP
were neither what was requested nor what was needed.
Trial was had January 6,1987, before the Honorable Ray M.
Harding Sr., sitting without a jury, in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Juab County, State of Utah.

EWP appeared through

its duly authorized representative, Ralph E. Watson, and with
counsel.

Memmott and co-defendants Delbert Crapo and Sandra

Memmott appeared with counsel.

No other co-defendants appeared.

Following trial on the merits, the Court rendered judgment in
favor of EWP against Memmott.

True and correct copies of the

trial court's Memorandum Decision, Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment, are appended hereto as
Appendices A through C.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The named defendants jointly own 52 or more placer

mining claims located in Juab and/or Millard Counties, State of
Utah.

(Transcript: pgs. 13, 28, 29, 129, 159)
2.

U.S. Interstate 15 (1-15) crosses over some of the

defendants' mining claims.
3.

(Transcript:

pgs. 13, 24)

Because of the overlap of 1-15 and the subject mining

claims, the defendants were involved in severance proceedings
with the State of Utah.
4.

(Transcript:

pgs. 14-16, 26-28)

Memmott and Delbert Crapo approached EWP in September of

1983 to discuss surveying services to be provided by EWP to
assist Memmott and Crapo in the proceedings.

(Transcript:

pgs.

21, 24, 35, 64)
5.

EWP's services were initiated in the field on October

17, 1983.
6.

(Transcript:

pgs. 44, 67)

At the end of the work day on October 17, 1983, Memmott

signed a document, the identity and contents of which were at
issue at trial.
7.

(Transcript:

pgs. 20, 39, 62-63)

Memmott identified the document he signed as "standard

work authorization" which authorized EWP to survey the ground
and/or allowed EWP to avoid trespass claims and described the
document as a blank sheet of paper containing only his signature
and the date.

Said document was from a pad of such forms

possessed by Ralph Watson (Watson) of EWP.

(Transcript:

pgs.

39, 147)
8.

EWP claimed that the document Memmott signed was the
8

standard form contract used by EWP with its clients and was in
fact the only such form used by EWP.

(Transcript: pgs. 46, 59-

60; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (Appendix D))
9.

EWP does not use a form such as that described by

Memmott.

(Transcript:

10.
while

pgs. 194-195)

Watson completed the contract for Memmott's signature

riding

in

EWP's

survey

vehicle

with

Doug

Grimshaw

(Grimshaw) on the way from Levan, Utah to the job-site on October
17, 1983. Watson and Grimshaw discussed the need to have Memmott
sign the contract that day.

(Transcript:

pgs. 46-47, 49-50, 62-

63)
11.

Memmott's signature appears in the bottom left-hand

corner of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. (Transcript: pg. 33)
12.

EWP's standard practice was to retain the original of

contracts with clients and to mail a copy of the same to the
client.

(Transcript:

13.
at trial.

pgs. 59-60)

EWP was unable to produce the original of the contract
EWP made a thorough and diligent search of its files

in an attempt to locate the original but was unsuccessful.
found

a copy

(Transcript:
14.

of the document

EWP

in the Memmott project file.

pgs. 60-61)

On September 30, 1986, EWP notified Memmott, et al.

that the contents of the contract would be the subject of proof
at trial and that a copy of the same would be used for such
purposes.

(Fourth District Court, Juab County, Civil No. 5891;

Pleading entitled "Notice")
9

15.
evidence

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was offered and accepted into
by

(Transcript:
16.

the

Court

over

Memmott, et

al.'s objections.

pg. 63)

The UDOT strip map was based upon a survey utilizing

the State Plane Coordinate System and the mining claims were
located according to a survey coordinate system established by
the GLO, which systems are wholly independent.
17.

Memmott either showed or directed EWP to the location

of several GLO section corners in the project area.

(Transcript:

pgs. 49, 101)
18.
field.
19.
Memmott

EWP found some ten or twelve GLO section corners in the
(Transcript:

Two or more of the GLO section corners referred to by
had

(Transcript:
20.

pg. 49)

been

destroyed

by

the

construction

of

1-15.

pgs. 52, 102)

Of the ten or twelve GLO section corners located, EWP

used approximately one-half in its survey.

(Transcript:

pgs.

52, 102)
21.

Of the five or six GLO section corners used in the EWP

survey, the UDOT right-of-way survey tied into only two such
corners.
22.

(Transcript:

pgs. 104-105, 111)

EWP's field effort totalled 25 1/2 hours of surveying

and related travel plus expenses. (Transcript:
23.

pgs. 44-45, 67)

EWP provided three separate items of information:
a.

The GLO map reflecting the location of the mining

claims and the centerline for 1-15;
10

b.

The 1-15 UDOT strip map reflecting the highway

right-of-way as-designed versus the location of the twelve
affected claims;
c.

A plat or map reflecting the two points where UDOT

had tied their survey into the GLO coordinate system.

This

plat further reflected the discrepancies between 1-15 as
designed (as per the right-of-way strip map) and as-built.
(Transcript:
24.

Pgs. 70-78, 129)

Memmott claims that the information provided by EWP was

useless for purposes of the severance hearing. (Transcript: 140145)
25.

Prior to retaining EWP, Memmott and Delbert Crapo had

requested the same services and received comparable information
from two other surveying firms.
26.

(Transcript:

Pgs. 11-12, 30)

Memmott has never tried to use the information provided

by EWP in the severance proceedings and does not know whether
such information was sufficient for such purposes.

(Transcript:

Pg. 155)
27.

Memmott admits that EWP is owed compensation for its

services but contests the amount claimed by EWP.

(Transcript:

pgs. 156-157)
29. The additional information which Memmott contends was
required but was not provided would have given only the as-built
location of 1-15 versus the mining claims where GLO section lines
cross the right-of-way and would have indicated nothing with
respect to the location of 1-15 and the mining claims between the
11

section lines•
30.

(Transcript:

pgs.

185-188)

The effort required to provide an as-built survey for

the length of 1-15 as it affects the subject mining claims was
considerably

more

(Transcript:

pgs. 135, 185-188)

31.

expensive

than

as

requested

by

Memmott.

EWP reflected bearings and distances along GLO section

lines to the 1-15 right-of-way as-built at the two places where
UDOT had made the same tie in surveying for the right-of-way
strip map because they were the only instances where a useful
comparison could be made between 1-15 as-built and as-designed.
(Transcript: pgs. 123)
32.
to

Memmott and Delbert Crapo did not have actual authority

contract with

EWP on behalf of the other co-defendants.

(Transcript: pgs. 37-38)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The trial court properly admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit 1

into evidence in that the same constituted other and secondary
evidence

of

the

contract

between

EWP

and

Memmott.

EWP

established that, more probably than not, the original had either
been lost, destroyed or was in the possession of Memmott and that
the copy was otherwise authentic.

EWP further gave due notice to

Memmott that it intended to make a copy of the contract the
subject of proof at trial.
II. Memmott has failed to sustain his burden on appeal in
that he has failed to marshall all of the evidence which supports
the trial court's findings and has failed to establish that such
findings

were

clearly

erroneous

(i.e. , that

the

evidence

supporting the trial court's findings was insufficient to support
said findings when viewed in a light most favorable thereto.
III.

Memmott's appeal of the trial court's findings that

the co-defendants are not liable to EWP and/or that there was no
evidence that they were responsible to Memmott for contribution
may not be properly before this Court and/or may be without
merit.

Memmott did not and has not made any cross-claims against

his co-defendants for contribution or otherwise.

The evidence at

trial indicated that Memmott had no actual authority to represent
his co-defendants in dealing with EWP; nor was there any evidence
that

Memmott

and

the

co-defendants

were

engaged

in

joint

operation of the subject mining claims giving arise to a claim of
apparent authority.
13

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1, A COPY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN EWP
AND MEMMOTT, WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE BY THE
TRIAL COURT.
Memmott

challenges

the

propriety

of

the

trial

admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 into evidence.

court's

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1 (Appendix D) was a photocopy of the EWP form contract
signed by Memmott.

Memmott challenged its admission on the basis

that the exhibit was not the original of the contract.
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, the general rule is that
the original contract is required to prove the content of that
contract.

Utah R. Evid. 1002.

However, this rule is expressly

subject to certain exceptions, id.

For example, a duplicate is

admissible to the same extent as an original except where there
is a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original or
admission of a duplicate on the same footing as an original would
be unfair under the circumstances.

id. , 1003.

Thus, in some

instances (as in the case at bar) a duplicate is not admissible
to the same extent as an original.

This does not mean however

that a duplicate is not admissible.

To be sure, an original is

not required and other evidence of its contents is admissible if,
inter alia, the original has been lost or destroyed or is in the
possession of the opponent against whom it is offered. Id., 1004;
UTAH CODE ANN. Sect. 78-25-16 (1953).
Rules

1002-1004

and

Sect.

78-25-16

are

essentially

codifications of the "best evidence rule" and its exceptions.
Caselaw interpreting both the codified and common law rules are
14

unanimous in their declaration that other or secondary evidence
is admissable upon an adequate showing that the "best" evidence
can't be found.

Meyer v. General American Corp. , 569 P.2d 1094

(Utah 1977); see, also, Amoco Production Co. v. United States.
455 F. Supp 46 (D.C Utah 1977); Idaho First National Bank v.
Wells. 596 P.2d 429 (Idaho 1979).

EWP submits that it made such

a showing at trial.
In its effort to have a copy of the contract admitted into
evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, EWP went to great lengths to
establish the authenticity of the exhibit.
1.

For example:

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is a sample of the only form

contract used by EWP with its clients.
2.

Watson prepared the original of Plaintiff's Exhibit

1 for Memmott's signature in the presence of Grimshaw.
3.

Watson and Grimshaw discussed the need to have

Memmott sign the contract on October 17, 1983.
4.

Watson saw Memmott sign the contract on October 17,

1983.
5.
6.

Memmott signed a document on October 17, 1983.
The signature which appears in the bottom left-hand

corner of the front page of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is in fact
a true and correct copy of Memmott's signature.
Watson further provided a detailed explanation as to why the
original was not to be found, including EWP's normal office
procedure for the handling of original contracts, where that
procedure might have broken down in this instance, the efforts
15

undertaken by EWP to find the original of the contract and,
finally, where Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was ultimately found,
also duly

EWP

and timely notified Memmott that the copy of the

contract would be the subject of proof at trial as required by
Rule 1004(3)•
Memmott argued that admission of the evidence under the
circumstances was unfair.

In support of this argument, Memmott

claims that he did not sign Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; yet he has
never explained

how his signature got there.

He did admit

signing a document which, as per Memmott's testimony, granted
permission

to

EWP to survey the property; yet the document

described (i.e., an otherwise blank sheet of paper with nothing
on it other than Memmott's signature and the date) could hardly
be interpreted as granting EWP authority to survey the property.
Memmott has not even produced the document he purportedly signed.
Memmott contends that the document he signed was a standard work
authorization form from a pad possessed by Watson; yet Watson and
Grimshaw testified that EWP uses only one form contract and that
was the type found in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

Finally, Memmott

argues that admission was improper because EWP did not offer any
testimony as to what terms were in the agreement; apparently
ignoring basic axioms of the law that a document speaks for
itself and a copy is the best secondary evidence of the contents
of a document.

In short, the factual support for the trial

court's admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 into evidence is not
only substantial and competent, it is infinitely more reliable
16

than

that

offered

by

Memmott

against

such

admission.

Accordingly, the trial court's admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1
was proper,
II.

MEMMOTT HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN ON APPEAL.
Memmott assails the findings of the trial court on the

ground that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support
said findings.

The challenge is raised on two fronts, to wit:

1) that Memmott signed Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; and 2) that EWP
substantially performed its obligations under its agreement with
Memmott.
Appellate court review of a trial court's findings of fact
is governed by Rule 52(a), U.R.Civ.P. (amended 1987), which, in
its pertinent parts, reads as follows:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A ... Findings
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses, [emphasis added]
To establish that the trial court's findings are clearly
erroneous, it is necessary for the appellant to:
[M]arshall all of the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings and to then demonstrate that even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the factual
determinations made by trial court, that the evidence is
insufficient to support its findings.
Harline v. Campbel 1, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986); see also,
Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987);

Scharf v. BMG Corp.,

700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield. 744 P.2d
301 (Utah App. 1987).
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In

short,

Memmott

must

accomplish

three

things

to

be

successful in challenging the findings of the trial court based
upon insufficiency of the evidence, to wit:
1.

Marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial

court's findings;
2.

Review all such evidence in a light most favorable to

the trial court's findings; and,
3.
a

Demonstrate that all such evidence, when viewed in such
light,

is

insufficient

to

support

the trial

court's

findings.
EWP submits that Memmott has failed to sustain his burden on all
three counts,
A.

Memmott has failed to marshal all of the evidence which
supports the trial court's findings.

Memmott's threshhold burden in challenging the trial court's
findings is to marshal all of the evidence in support of those
findings,

EWP submits that Memmott has utterly failed to sustain

this burden.

To be

sure, Memmott has marshalled

only the

evidence that Memmott himself concludes was "presumably relied
upon"

by

the

trial

(Appellant's Brief:
further reflected

court

in

pg. 11)

support

of

its

findings.

Memmott's selective approach is

in his brief wherein he concludes that the

trial court's evidentiary basis "appear[s]" to be based upon
certain selected exhibits "among other items" and "primarily" the
testimony of EWP's Ralph Watson.
That

Memmott's

selective

(id.)
approach

to

marshalling

the

evidence is one of convenience, if not necessity, becomes obvious
18

upon an examination of the evidence which Memmott has ignored in
his appeal.

For example, in his challenge to the court's finding

that he signed the EWP form contract, Memmott does not mention
that:
1.

On the way to the job site on October 17, 1983,

Watson prepared the contract for Memmott's signature and
asked

Grimshaw

to

remind him to have Memmott sign the

contract that day.
2.

The contract signed by Memmott was the only form

contract or authorization used by EWP.
3.

The signature which appears in the bottom left-

hand corner of the front-page of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is in
fact a true and correct copy of Memmott's signature.
These facts are clearly supportive of the trial court's finding
that Memmott signed the EWP form contract; yet they are ignored
by Memmott in his appeal.
Similarly, in his challenge to the trial court's finding
that EWP substantially performed its contract, Memmott fails to
mention that:
1.

Memmott and Crapo had previously asked two other

surveying firms to provide the same service as was requested
of EWP and these firms provided essentially the same work
product as was provided by EWP.
2.

Memmott never tried to use the information provided

by EWP in the severance hearing and in fact does not know
whether it was sufficient for that purpose.
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3.

Memmott admits that EWP is owed money for its

services and his dispute, at least initially, was not as to
the existence of the debt, but rather as to the amount.
4.

The information provided by EWP to Memmott did

reflect, inter alia, the location of the twelve impacted
mining claims versus the 1-15 right-of-way as shown on the
UDOT strip maps and, further, compared the location of 1-15
as-designed versus as-built at the only two points where
UDOT had tied into the same survey coordinate system used in
locating the mining claims.
5.

The additional information which Memmott contends

was required but was not provided would have given only the
as-built location of 1-15 versus the mining claims where GLO
section

lines

cross

the

right-of-way

and

would

have

indicated nothing with respect to the location of 1-15 and
the mining claims between the section lines.
6.

The effort required to provide an as-built survey

of 1-15 versus the location of the mining claims for the
entire length of the pertinent sections of 1-15 would have
required a much more expensive effort than that which was
requested by Memmott.
(These are but some of the facts which Memmott fails to consider
in this appeal;

still others appear under sub-point B. which

follows.)
The import of these facts on the trial court's findings can
scarcely be overstated.

Memmott and Crapo claimed that EWP did
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not provide the information they requested,; yet by their own
testimony they had, previous to contacting EWP, made the same
request of two other surveying firms and received information
effectively identical to that provided by EWP.

Not only did this

confirm that Memmott had received that which he had requested, it
confirmed EWP's contention that the services provided by EWP were
consistent with accepted surveying practice and its limitations.
Memmott, et al. also argued that the information EWP provided was
useless in the severance hearing; yet they never tried to use it
in the hearing.

In fact, the only competent evidence is that the

information was adequate for this purpose and the trial court so
concluded.
By ignoring

crucial evidence which clearly supports the

trial court's findings, Memmott has failed to meet his "threshold
burden on appeal, one that is neither elective nor optional."
Fitzgerald, supra at 16.
job for him. id.

And this Court will not do Memmott7s

Under these circumstances, this Court can reach

but one conclusion:

that the findings of the trial court were

not clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed.
B.

Ashton, supra.

Memmott has failed to consider the evidence which
supports the trial court's findings in a light most
favorable to those findings.

As previously noted, Memmott has failed to marshal all of
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings.

However,

assuming arguendo that Memmott has sustained this threshhold
burden, he has nonetheless failed to sustain yet another aspect
of his burden on appeal.

Specifically, Memmott has failed to
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discuss the evidence in support of the trial court's findings in
a light most favorable to those findings.
Of the facts which Memmott chose to discuss on appeal and
which support the trial court's findings, Memmott has nonetheless
misinterpreted and/or quoted many out of context in an effort to
lend support to his own version of the facts, as opposed to how
they were found by the trial court.
1.

For example:

Memmott contends that the number of GLO section

monuments "that had been identified and shown EWP was in
excess of twelve",

(Appellant's Brief:

Pg. 9)

In fact,

EWP was either shown or directed to some GLO corners, of
which it was able locate some "ten or twelve."

Two or more

of the GLO section corners which Memmott said existed had in
fact

been
2.

destroyed

during

the

construction

of

1-15.

Memmott also attempts to use the language quoted

in item 1. to imply that the number of ties EWP should have
made to the mining claims should equal the number of GLO
section corners located.

In fact, of the "ten or twelve"

GLO section corners which were actually found, EWP felt only
five or six were possibly useful in its effort to obtain
surveying information.
3.

Of the five or six GLO section corners which EWP

utilized in its surveying effort, the UDOT survey for 1-15
had been tied into only two.
4.

Memmott

supposedly

signed

a

"standard

work

authorization" provided by Watson granting EWP the authority
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to perform the survey and/or avoid trespass claims; yet
Memmott described a document that was blank, save for his
signature and the date.
5.

Memmott states that "EWP's survey crew spent two

days surveying in the field", the implication being that a
normal eight-hour work day was involved. (Appellant's Brief:
pg. 8)

In fact, EWP spent twenty-five and one-half (25-1/2)

hours over two days in the field.
6.

Memmott states that EWP's services could have been

provided a third of the cost (Appellant's Brief: pg. 14) ;
yet the trial court specifically found that EWP's charges
were reasonable.
7.

Memmott argues "it is also clear that only Mr.

Watson saw Mr. Ralph Memmott sign anything despite Mr.
Watson, Mr. Grimshaw, Mr. Crapo and Ms. Memmott all being
present at the time."

(Appellant's Brief:

fact,

to

Memmott

Plaintiff's
testified,
Memmott

admits

Exhibit
or

at

signed

(Transcript:

1.

least
"the

Pg. 20)

signing

something,

Furthermore,
implied

blank

Pg. 16)

Delbert

if

In
not

Crapo

in his testimony, that

work

order

sheet

...

."

Finally, although Crapo, Grimshaw and

Ms. Memmott were also on site the day the contract was
signed, the evidence suggests that only Memmott and Watson
»

were in a position to testify as to what was actually
signed.

(Transcript:

pg. 118)

These are but a few examples of where Memmott has failed to
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discuss the evidence which supports the trial court's findings in
the manner required by law.

Indeed, he has again ignored a

substantial portion of this evidence.
EWP submits that Memmott's selective use and interpretation
of the evidence given at trial does not rise to the level of
viewing the evidence which supports the trial court's findings in
a light most favorable to those findings.

He has done nothing

more than present and argue his version of the facts. Because he
has failed to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's findings, Memmott's appeal must fail. Harline;
Ashton; Scharf; Fitzgerald, supra.
C.

Memmott has failed to demonstrate that
court's findings were clearly erroneous.

the

trial

Again, assuming arguendo that Memmott has marshalled all of
the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings and that he
has addressed such evidence in a light most favorable to those
findings, he has nonetheless failed to demonstrate that such
evidence was insufficient to support those findings and that,
accordingly, the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous.
By way of example, consider Memmott's challenge to the trial
court's findings that he signed the EWP form contract.

There is

ample evidence in the record to suggest that he did in fact sign
that document.

Most telling is the fact that his signature

appears on et copy of the contract.

Despite such evidence, he

contended that he did not sign that document; yet he offered no
explanation as to how his signature got there, he did not produce
the document he says he signed, nor did he convince anyone, let
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alone the trial court, that a blank sheet of paper with his
signature on it constitutes an authorization to survey property.
Consider

to the trial

court's

findings that EWP substantially performed its contract.

Memmott

requested

also

and

Memmott's

received

challenge

virtually

identical

services

and

information from three different surveying firms, including EWP;
yet his defense was, inter alia, that he did not receive what he
requested.

He argued that the information EWP provided was

useless; yet he never tried to use it.

As previously noted,

there is no competent evidence that that information was anything
but sufficient for the severance hearings.
Memmott has simply failed to demonstrate that the evidence
which supports the trial court's findings is insufficient and, as
such, that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous.
What Memmott has demonstrated, if nothing else, is that there was
a conflict in the evidence at trial.

Conflicts in the evidence

are not sufficient to disturb the findings of the trier-of-fact
as this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.

Rule 52(a), supra.; Chandler vs. Mathews, 734 P.2d

907 (Utah 1987); Circle Air Freight vs. Boyce Equipment, 745 P.2d
828 (Utah App. 1987); Gillmor vs. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461 (Utah
App. 1987).

In short, Memmott has failed to sustain the third

aspect of his burden on appeal and his appeal, therefor, must
fail. Harline; Ashton; Scharf; Fitzgerald; supra.
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III. MEMMOTT'S APPEAL REGARDING THE LIABILITY OF THE CODEFENDANTS MAY NOT BE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT AND/OR MAY
BE WITHOUT MERIT.
Memmott contends that the trial court erred in concluding
that his co-defendants were not directly liable to EWP on the
debt and that there was no evidence that they were liable to
Memmott

in

contribution.

EWP

believes

that

Memmott's

co-

defendants are in fact liable to EWP for the services rendered by
EWP and attempted to establish this point at trial.

However, the

trial court concluded otherwise.
EWP does not oppose
fact

Memmott's

Memmott's appeal on this point.

current

counsel

continues

to

remaining co-defendants, as he did at trial,

represent

If in
the

EWP would be

willing to stipulate to an amendment of judgment making the
remaining
alternative

co-defendants

liable

is available).

to

EWP

(if

in

fact

this

A second alternative under this

scenario would be for the judgment of the trial court to be
reversed on this point by the Court and remanded to the trial
court for a decision consistent with the Court's ruling.
Regardless of whether Memmott7s current counsel continues to
represent Memmott's co-defendants, EWP must confess that it does
not believe that this aspect of the appeal is properly before
this Court.
defendants

Memmott did not make any cross-claim against his coat trial.

To be

sure, the defense

of all co-

defendants against EWP's claims were initiated, prosecuted, and
concluded as a single effort.

Under such circumstances it is

inconceivable as to how apparently new claims could become a
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matter for appeal.
Finally, Memmott testified at trial that he had no actual
authority to represent anyone other than himself in his dealings
with

EWP.

Defense

closing argument.

counsel at trial echoed

this position

in

Memmott has apparently changed his tune and is

now apparently attempting to backdoor the issue under the guise
of

apparent

authority

partnership.

As

by

Memmott

claiming
duly

that

notes

there

in

his

was

a

mining

argument,

joint

operation is a prerequisite to a finding of a mining partnership.
Mud Control Laboratories vs. Covey, 269 P.2d 854, 2 Utah 2d 85
(Utah

1954).

introduced

However,

at

trial

that

there

was

Memmott

and

absolutely
his

no

evidence

co-defendants

were

engaged in both the joint ownership and operation of the subject
mining

claims.

partnership;

Without

joint

operation,

there

is no mining

and without a mining partnership, there can be no

apparent authority.

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly admitted Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 as
other evidence of the contract between EWP and Memmott.
has failed to sustain his burden on appeal.
marshal

all

of the evidence

in support

Memmott

He has failed to

of the trial

court's

findings; he has failed to review such evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court's findings; and, he has failed to
demonstrate that such evidence, when viewed in such a light, was
27

insufficient to support such findings such that said findings
were clearly erroneous. Memmott's appeal regarding the liability
of

co-defendants

is not properly

before

this Court and is

otherwise without merit.
EWP repectfully requests that Memmott's appeal be dismissed,
that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed, and that EWP be
awarded costs and attorney's fees on appeal and/or that the
matter be remanded to the trial court for determination and award
of attorneys fees.
REPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2* *
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eg,

28

day of

r^cUs***
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APPENDIX A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**•••••

ECKHOFF, WATSON, WATSON &
PREATOR, et al.

Case Number

5891

Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

RALPH MEMMOTT, et al.,
Defendant.
********

This matter came before the court for trial on January
6, 1987, in Juab County.

Plaintiff was present and represented

by its attorney, Craig C. Coburn.

Defendants were present and

represented by their attorney, Gregory M. Holbrook.

The court

having heard evidence, reviewed the exhibits and having taken the
matter under advisement now enters its:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
The

plaintiff

referred to as EWP.

shall

hereafter

for

simplicity

be

The defendant Ralph Memmott entered into an

agreement with EWP on the 17th of October, 1983, wherein EWP
would provide certain survey and engineering services to the
defendants and the defendants agreed to pay an estimated fee of
$6,000.00.
entered

into

The court expressly finds that Mr. Ralph Memmott
said

agreement

individually

and

there

was

no

evidence introduced that his signing of the written agreement was
other than in his own behalf.

Whether he has arrangements with

the other property owners for contribution is not in evidence.
The court finds that the plaintiff substantially performed the

service contracted for and expended time and effort in excess of
that estimated and that such expenditures were reasonable.

EWP

has provided all existing survey ties, location of defendants1
mining

claims

in relationship

to the

interstate

highway

as

indicated on the Department of Transportation's highway strip
maps and further provided the defendant with a GLO map showing
the location of the interstate highway as it related to the
defendants' claims.

Such survey work and office work as was

performed by the defendant and the resulting work product was
sufficient to substantially comply with the intent of the parties
and to satisfy the needs of the defendants.
The court expressly finds that there is no evidence
that the other named defendants have any liability under the
complaint or the agreement entered into by Mr. Memmott with the
plaintiff, and therefore the complaint is dismissed as to those
other named parties.
The

plaintiff

in

its

complaint

having

prayed

for

$6,000.00 only, judgment is granted on plaintiff's second cause
of action in the sum of $6,000.00.
The court further awards interest at the rate of 18%
per annum until entry of judgment from October 29, 1984.
date of

commencement

of

interest

This

is in accordance with Mr.

Watson's testimony as to the commencement of that interest.
There being no evidence as to attorneys' fees, no
attorneys' fees are awarded.
court.

Plaintiff

is awarded costs of

A cost bill to be entered in accordance with Rule 54(d)

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Attorney

for

the

plaintiff

to

prepare

appropriate

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and submit the
same to defendant for approval as to form prior to submission to
the court for signature.
DATED this o

cc:

Gregory M. Holbrook
Craig C. Coburn

/
day of Japdar

APPENDIX B

CRAIG C. COBURN #0688
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 East Broadway, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-1300
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF
)
]I
]'
)
!

ECKHOFF, WATSON, WATSON AND
PREATOR ENGINEERING, INC.,
dba Eckhoff, Watson and
Preator Engineering, a Utah
corporation,

UTATH

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

Plaintiff,

i

Civil No. 5891

vs.
RALPH MEMMOTT, GRACE MEMMOTT,
SANDRA MEMMOTT, SUE MEMMOTT,
DELBERT CRAPO, SYRELDA CRAPO,
TRENT CRAPO and KENT CRAPO,
Defendants.

]
]
i

Hon. Ray M. Harding

]

This matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of January,
1987, before the

Honorable Ray M. Harding, Plaintiff appearing

in person together
Defendants

Ralph

with

its attorney,

Memmott,

Delbert

Craig C. Coburn, and

Crapo

and Susan

Memmott

appearing in person and together with their attorney, Gregory M.
Holbrook,
evidence
premises,

and witnesses having been sworn and testified and
taken

and

the

Court

being

fully

apprised

in

the

does hereby enter the following Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on October 17, 1983, Plaintiff and Defendant Ralph

Memmott entered into a written contract whereby Plaintiff was to
1

provide certain surveying services to Defendant and Defendant
agreed to pay an estimated fee of $6,000.00.
2.

Defendant Ralph Memmott entered into said agreement

individually and not for and on behalf of any

of the other named

Defendants.
3.

There is no evidence that Defendant Ralph Memmott had

arrangements with the other property owners for contribution

for

Plaintiff's services.
4.

Plaintiff

substantially

performed

the

services

contracted for and expended time and effort in excess of that
estimated
further

and such expenditures were reasonable.

provided

all

existing

survey

ties,

Plaintiff

location

of

Defendant's mine claims or relationship to the interstate highway
as indicated on the Department of Transportation's highway strip
maps and further provided said Defendant witht a GLO map showing
the location of the interstate highway as it related to the
Defendant's claims.
performed

Such survey work and office work as was

by Plaintiff

and

the

resulting

work

product

was

sufficient to substantially comply with the intent of the parties
and to satisfy the needs of the Defendants.
5.

Defendant Ralph Memmott failed and refused to compensate

Plaintiff as agreed.
6.

The contract in question provided for interest to be

paid on all past due amounts at the rate of eighteen percent
(18%) per annum.
7.

The

contract

provided

2

that in the event it became

necessary for Plaintiff to retain an attorney to collect under
the

contract, all costs of collection, including

reasonable

attorney's fees, were to be paid by Defendant Ralph Memmott.
8.

Defendant Ralph Memmott's obligation

to

compensate

Plaintiff became past due on October 29, 1984.
9.

Plaintiff incurred $2,500.00 in attorney's fees in this

matter exclusive of court costs.
10.

There is no evidence that the other named Defendants

have any liability under the Complaint or the subject contract.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That there existed a valid and enforceable

contract

between Plaintiff and Defendant Ralph Memmott.
2.

That Plaintiff substantially performed

its obligations

under said contract.
3.

That Defendant Ralph Memmott breached his obligations

under said contract.
4.

That as a direct and proximate result of said breach,

Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $6,000.00, and is
entitled to Judgment in said amount.
5.
entitled

That pursuant to said contract, Plaintiff is further
to interest on said amount calculated

at

eighteen

percent (18%) per annum from and after October 29, 1984

through

date of Judgment.
6.

That pursuant to said contract, Plaintiff is entitled to

attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500.00.
7.

That Plaintiff

is

further

entitled

to

Judgment

representing court costs of $54.50 incurred in this matter.
3

8.

Plaintiff has no cause of action against the remaining

named Defendants in thLs matter.
DATED this ~^5

a a y Qf _

CC3/EWP/FF

4

APPENDIX C

CRAIG C. COBURN #0688
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 East Broadway, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-1300
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF
ECKHOFF, WATSON, WATSON AND
PREATOR ENGINEERING, INC.,
dba Eckhoff, Watson and
Preator Engineering, a Utah
corporation,

1

UTATH

AMENDED JUDGMENT

'

Plaintiff,
1
]

vs.
RALPH MEMMOTT, GRACE MEMMOTT,
SANDRA MEMMOTT, SUE MEMMOTT,
DELBERT CRAPO, SYRELDA CRAPO,
TRENT CRAPO and KENT CRAPO,

i

Civil No. 5891

Hon. Ray M. Harding

Defendants.
This matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of January,
1987, before the Honorable Ray M. Harding,
in person

together with

Defendants

Ralph

its attorney,

Memmott,

Delbert

Plaintiff appearing

Craig C. Coburn, and

Crapo

and Susan

Memmott

appearing in person and together with their attorney, Gregory M.
Holbrook,
evidence

and witnesses having been sworn and testified and
taken

and

the Court being

fully

apprised

in • the

premises, and the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That Plaintiff

have

judgment against Defendant Ralph

Memmott in the principle amount of $6,000,00, plus
1

interest

thereon from and after October 29, 1984 through date of Judgment
at eighteen percent (18%) per annum ($2,96 per diem),
fees of $2,500.00, and court costs of $54.50,

plus

attorney's
interest

thereon at the highest rate provided by law.
2.

That Plaintiff's Complaint as against all other named

Defendants is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this J & ^ ^ a y

rfjK^d

of

BY THE COURT:

CC3/EWP/JUDG

2
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APPENDIX D

Eckhoff, Watson and Preatortngineering
580 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Phone: (801) 586-3004

' C
Date: /QrA
Job No.

I\
^
Z./4&*>

Pa/nh
/YJAmjO^tf'
. hereinafter CLIENT, a(n)
;
does/hereby authorize ECXKOFF, WATSON AND PREATOR ENGINEERING, hereinafter ENGINEER,
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, to perform t
services set forth below, subject to the terms and conditions set forth below and on t
reverse side hereof.
r^ /f
/ A. Client^Information (complete^ all items):
Name £ * / o / j tWtwMefr
Representative
Address Sx^g*"^. ^^>70 g ,
R O. P>er*. 6,&**>
City
fi//mg^T
'
State u.-^U^
Owner of Property Involved
Credit References
.
B.

7 ? # i r £ra./C>c>
7V*> - f^ZZPhone 74<j -.T^^C
f)^p3cX.
?j</-Jj//2
&
Zip < ; ^ £ 3 /

Project Description (attach Schedule if necessary):
Project Hamed/a,^
/ocjuf/£m
rtod&>cL4s /AtyftA*
Client PO No.
Location jJcjUr S^it>in / Uh^U
'
'
Estimated Completion Date:
^
£(AC'J~
L
Description of ENGINEER'S Services: J ^ g f ^
*/ 'VHM^
0J*t«\ s>*t MO/)S+

1 1

111

I

I

I

,

II

I

1

,

1

C. Compensation:
1.

Basis (check and complete one (1)):
Salary Cost and Reimbursable Expenses times multipliers.
Salary Cost Multiplier: .3,2.
Est. Fee: $
Reimbursable Expenses Multiplier:

D.

E.

s5£&Q^

/./5

o

Lump Sum With Progress Payments (attach Schedule).

o

Cost Plus Fixed Fee With Progress Payments (attach Schedule).

o
Percentage of Construction Cost With Progress Payments (attach Schedule)
2.
CLIENT shall pay a retainage fee of $
, which fee shall be paid in fu
prior to commencement of the work herein contemplated. Said fee shall 1
applied
to -CLIENT'S final payment for the services provided hereunde
CLIENT has read'and understood the terms and conditions set forth on the reverse si<
hereof and agrees N "that such items are hereby incorporated into and made a part i
:
this agreement.
Having read, understood and agreed to the foregoing, CLIENT
and ENGINEER,
through their authorized representatives,
have subscribed their names
effective the
day of
, 19
.

CLIEOT

by ai
here<

ECKHOFF, WATSON AND PREATOR ENGINEERING

*4s tcL—^Jt
Date:
(GP\Z\*P^
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1.1

1.2

3.6

S a l a r y Cost

Ttie direct payroll expense for each employee engaged on the Project (computed by dividing
the annual pay/ell cost ( i . e . , annual wages or salary) for such employee by 1868 hours).
Multiplied by LIS to cover payroll taxes and insurance incident to employment, multiplied by the number of hours worled by such employee on the Project. The direct payroll
expense for overtime hours worked by an employee on the Project shall be multiplied by
1.72S ( i . e . , l . S x 1 . I S ) , provided that CLIENT has authorized such overtime.
Reimbursable Expenses
Expenditures made By the ENGINEER, i t s employees or i t s consultants in the interest of
the Project. Reimbursable Expenses include out are not limited to:
1.2.1 Expense of transportation, subsistence and lodging when traveling in connection
with the Project.
1.2.2 Expense of long distance or t o l l telephone c a l l s , telegrams, messenger s e r v i c e ,
f i e l d office expenses, and f e e s paid for securing approval of authorities having
jurisdiction over the Project.
1.2.1 Expense of a l l reproduction, postage and handling of drawings, specifications,
reports or other Project-related instruments of service of the ENGINEER.
1.2.4 Expense of computer time including charges for proprietary programs.
1.2.5 Expense of preparing perspectives, renderings or models.
3.7
ARTICLE 2.

I

2.2

COMPENSATION

Invoicing Procedure
CLIENT will be invoiced at U * end of the f i r s t calendar month following the e f f e c t i v e
date of t h i s Agreement and at the end of each calendar month thereafter. Such invoices
shall reflect billing for work performed by ENGINEER during the month invoiced. Payment
on an invoice i s due upon receipt of the invoice by CLIENT. In the event of a dispute
regarding a b i l l i n g , CLIENT shall pay a l l undisputed amounts as per this Article.
Late Payment
ENCIWFEK may assess a carrying charge of l . S percent per month on invoice amounts due and
not paid within thirty (30) days of the date of invoice, which charge CLIENT warrants
will he paid on demand.
ENG1NFER aay, in i t s sole discretion, suspend or terminate I t s
services under this Agreement should CLIENT not satisfy any amount invoiced within
forty-five (4S) days of the date of invoice. ENGINEER further reserves the right to
withhold any instruments of i t s s e r v i c e , or copies thereof, from CLIENT on any project
pending payment on CLIENT'S outstanding indebtedness.
ARTICLE 3.

SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Additional Services
Services not expressly or implicitly included with those herein specified, as determined
by ENGINEER, are not covered by this Agreement.
Such services may be provided only upon;
execution of amendment in compliance with t h i s Agreement.
*•* Termination for Cause
This Agreement may be terminated by either party upon seven (7) days written notice
should the other party fail substantially to perform in accordance with this Agreement
through no fault of the party i n i t i a t i n g the termination.
*•* Termination Without Cause
This Agreement may be terminated by CLIENT upon at least seven (7) days written notice to
ENGINEER in the event that the Project i s permanently abandoned.
\ Termination Adjustment; Payment
If this Agreement i s terminated through no fault of the ENGINEER, CLIENT s h a l l , upon
'"
r e v e s t , pay ENGINEER for services performed and Reimbursable Expenses incurred in accordance with t h i s Agreement, plus a Termination Adjustment equalling fifteen percent ( I S t )
of the estimated fee remaining to be earned at the time of termination to account for
ENGlNFER's rescheduling adjustments, reassignment of personnel and related costs Incurred
due to termination. Should CLIENT so terminate this Agreement, ENGINEER reserves the
right to complete such of i t s services and a report on tl»e services performed to date of
termination to the extent that ENGINEER, in i t s sole judgment, deeas necessary t o place
I t s f i l e s in order and/or to protect ENGINEER'S professional reputation, for which an
additional termination charge to cover the cost thereof in an amount not in excess of
thirty percent (301) of the charges incurred prior to the date of termination shall be
paid by CLIENT upon ENGINEER'S request.
*'* Construction Estimates
Estimates of construction c o s t , material quantities and construction time estimates provided by ENGINEER under this Agreement are subject to change and are contingent upon factors over which ENGINEER has no control.
ENGINEER does not guarantee the accuracy of
such estimates.

3.8

3.9

*

Limitation on Liability
CTTFNT limits ENGlNFER's l i a b i l i t y to CLIENT, contractors, subcontractors and their
agents,
employees and
consultants, which may arise from or be due d i r e c t l y or
indirectly to the professional a c t s , errors and/or omissions of ENGINEER, i t s agents,
employees or consultants such that ENGINEER'S aggregate l i a b i l i t y to such parties does
not exceed ENGINEER'S fee or $ 50,000, whichever i s l e s s . CLIENT l i m i t s ENGINEER'S l i a b i l i t y to a l l other third parties which may arise from or be due d i r e c t l y or indirectly
to such a c t s , errors, and/or omissions such that ENGINEER'S tota'i aggregate l i a b i l i t y to
a l l parties for such a c t s , errors and/or omissions does not exceed ENGINEER'S fee or $
SO,000. whichever i s greater. CLIENT limits ENGINEER'S l i a b i l i t y to CLIENT and a l l third
parties which may arise
from
or be due d i r e c t l y or Indirectly t o ENGINEER'S
non-professional a c t s , errors, or omissions such that ENGlNFER's total aggregate l i a b i l i t y t o a l l parties for a l l a c t s , errors and/or omissions, professional or otherwise,
does not exceed $ 100,000.
CLIENT shall Indemnify ENGINEER, i t s agents, employees and
.consultants for l i a b i l i t y in excess of the l i m i t s stated herein. For purposes of
computing l i a b i l i t y , l i a b i l i t y shall include defense c o s t s and attorneys f e e s . Prior tc
the beginning of performance of services hereunder, these l i m i t s may be increased up to
ENGINEER'S then e f f e c t i v e coverage limits upon CLIENT'S written request and agreement to
pay an additional fee of 1/41 of the amount of any increase in coverage.
Limited Warranty
EWTIRTEK warrants that i t s findings, recommendations, specifications or advice provided
hereunder will be promulgated and prepared in accordance with the standards of the consulting
engineering profession in Utah.
ENGINEER makes no other
warranty OT
representation, express or implied, and CLIENT hereby expressly waives the same. Liab i l i t y under t h i s warranty i s expressly limited as per Section 3 . 6 .
Ownership of Documents
All original tracings, notes, data and other documents are instruments of professional
service and shall be the property of ENGINEER. Modification, or use on other projects,
of such instruments of service, or copies thereof, without ENGINEER'S prior express
written consent shall be at CLIENT'S sole risk. CLIENT shall hold harmless, indemnify
and defend ENGINEER as to any and a l l claims arising out of any such nonpermissive modif i c a t i o n or use.
CLIENT Information
ENlTINEFE shall have the right to rely on any and a l l information supplied t o ENGINEER by
or through CLIENT or i t s representative, and shall not have a duty to verify the accuracy
of such information' unless otherwise agreed herein.
CLIENT shall hold harmless,
indemnify and defend ENGINEER as to any claims r e l a t e d , d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , tc
ENGINEER'S use of or reliance on any such information.

3.1

ARTICLE 4.

GENERAL TERNS AND CONDITIONS

4.1

Applicable Law
This Agreement shall be interpreted and enforced according to the laws of the State of
Utah.
4.2 Assignment: Subcontract ing
Neither CLIENT nor UJuINEBt shall assign its Interest in this Agreement without the
written consent of the other. ENGINEER may subcontract any portion of the work to be
performed hereunder without such consent.
4.3 Force Majeure
Any delay or default in the performance of any obligation of e i t h e r party under this
Agreement resulting from any cause(s) beyond said party's reasonable c o n t r o l , shall not
be deemed a breach of t h i s Agreement.
The occurrence of any such event shall suspend
the obligations of said party as long as performance i s delayed or prevented thereby.

4.4

^joryy'^f***

CLIENT shall reimburse ENGINEER for any and a l l c o s t s incurred in the c o l l e c t i o n of
* CLIENT'S overdue account, including reasonable attorney's f e e s . In the event that CLIENT
unsuccessfully a s s e r t s a claim against ENGINEER, a t law or otherwise, for any alleged
a c t , error and/or omission, professional or otherwise, alleged to a r i s e out of or be due
d i r e c t l y or Indirectly to ENGINEER'S performance of the professional services herefor
contracted, CLIENT shall pay a l l c o s t s , including reasonable attorney's f e e s , incurred by
ENGDJEER or i t s assignee(s) or subrogee(s) in defending against said claim.
4-S Severability; Waiver
Tii tne event any provisions of this Agreement s h a l l be held to be invalid and
unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall remain v a l i d and binding upon the parties.
One or more waiver of any term, condition or other provision of t h i s Agreement by either
party shall not be construed as a waiver of a subsequent breach of the same or any other
provision.
4.6 Amendments; Merger
This Agreement may be amended only by written instrument expressly referring hereto and
duly signed by the p a r t i e s . This Agreement c o n s t i t u t e s the e n t i r e and integrated agreement between the parties hereto and supercedes a l l prior n e g o t i a t i o n s , representations
and/or agreements, written or oral.

